Then, we have carefully arranged it so that there is no identity coming from
the access network provider, and because the location is coming from that
provider, we really don't want to. But even if we did, we would need a
really good identifier, and there isn't one.
The problem we have with -direct is anonymous callers, and if they have any
option, they would also be location-less. Until and unless we get rid of
anonymity, we can't encourage service provider-less calls. The draft does
not make any provision to provide any kind of identity. Many networks
(think free wifi for example) would make providing good identity difficult.
The fact is that there is a SERVICE provider in nearly all of the
communications systems. The SERVICE provider is in a position to assist
the emergency calling system when it needs more information. That's what a
good SERVICE provider does. Cutting them out is not a great idea. Most of
the attempts to provide real time communications between people have evolved
to using service providers, even when there were alternatives. File
transfer via something like Torrent is a counterexample (which isn't real
time), but even there, you end up with service providers like The Pirate Bay
(R.I.P) to provide introduction services. I don't think we're going to see
changes that eliminate service providers, and in this case, they provide
value to the emergency calling systems. All of the emergency professionals
I know have issues with service providers, but they would react with horror
if you suggested cutting them out. Ask them, please.
So, I claim you have a solution in search of a problem. We have solved the
"calling network isn't the access network" problem already. Service
providers ARE in the path now, in nearly every case (in fact a counter
example escapes me, although there probably are some). There is no movement
I can detect which would change that any time soon; quite the opposite. We
have a known killer problem without some kind of subscription to a service
that provides a good identity, for which you provide no answers. We have
experience with the killer problem: sim-less calling was supposed to provide
a way to make an emergency call in exactly the kinds of circumstances you
are describing. Our real world experience is that you create a huge problem
that diverts resources from helping people to chasing scammers and
flea-market sellers.
Nothing is perfect: you can get a AIM screen name without a very good
identity for example. However, the notion that we're going to provide
direct access without a service provider deliberately, especially without
really good identity from the access network is, in my opinion not only a
no, it's a heck no. I'll line up as many emergency service professionals as
you would like to tell you this is a harmful idea.
On 10/26/09 7:56 PM, "Dawson, Martin" <Martin.Dawson@andrew.com> wrote:
> I am glad this has come up. It's a debate that has to happen if we are to move
> beyond a long standing legacy misconception.
>
> In the circuit service world - whether it was POTS or mobile, the access
> network had full responsibility for delivering the emergency call. In that
> world, routing an emergency call meant getting a circuit established to the
> correct call center. In most parts of the world, this was done using the
> regional part of the PSTN to switch the circuit to a call center on the PSTN.
> In some jurisdictions, such as the US, it was done directly from the local
> exchange carrier to the call center. Either way, there was no third party
> involved.
>
> Now we have the Internet. We still have public access network providers. They
> switch packets onto the Internet for their subscribers. They can similarly
> ensure that packets reach the local emergency call centers.
>
> The fact is that there was no equivalent of a VSP in the traditional
> environment. VoIP is a presence service, and it had no common equivalent in
> the PSTN world. It could have, but the narrowband state of technology and the
> common market use cases didn't support its development. By the time ISDN
> arrived, the PSTN had already slipped into its palliative stage without
> realizing it.
>
> It's an entrenched misconception that because the circuit service provided by
> exchange carriers was most commonly used for "voice" (but, it should be noted,
> also for fax, telex, tty, security system monitoring and, even, IP data) that
> VSPs are somehow equivalent to exchange carriers. They are not.
>
> Indeed, involving VSPs in emergency calls is the Internet equivalent of
> involving long distance providers in POTS emergency calls. They are neither
> necessary nor particularly helpful; they can't be guaranteed to be within the
> emergency jurisdiction; depending on them actually diminishes the efficacy of
> emergency service access. It does not help the caller, the emergency service,
> nor the third party to insist on the third party's involvement.
>
> It can't be helped if you have over sold the benefits of VSP involvement to
> yourself and others Brian. It is time to have a reasoned debate. From my
> perspective, the argument that there is no "subscription" involved is patently
> false. There has to be a subscription of some description in order to get to
> the Internet. Yes, there is free public Internet access (just as there are
> free courtesy phones on the PSTN and free access to emergency services from
> pay phones. All these services are still connected to the public Internet
> infrastructure and they all represent an "operator" with some level of
> information about the caller.
>
> With the over-emphasis on VSPs, what is missing from the ECRIT and i3 models
> is the direct interface for querying the access network for subscriber data
> (should it prove necessary). These models need to take the long view of how
> emergency calling is done in the Internet age; they should not be protracting
> an unnecessary reliance on VSPs.
>
> I have deleted the premature and prejudicial text from the subject heading.
> And I'll leave this on ECRIT as the most appropriate WG.
>
> Cheers,
> Martin
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ecrit-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ecrit-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Hannes Tschofenig
> Sent: Tuesday, 27 October 2009 8:23 AM
> To: ecrit@ietf.org
> Subject: [Ecrit] FW: [Geopriv] Winterbottom-ecrit-direct considered harmful,
> at least given our current experiences
>
> FYI: feedback from Brian regarding a recent ECRIT contribution.
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: geopriv-bounces@ietf.org
>> [mailto:geopriv-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
>> Sent: 26 October, 2009 23:10
>> To: geopriv@ietf.org
>> Subject: [Geopriv] Winterbottom-ecrit-direct considered
>> harmful, at least given our current experiences
>>
>> The notion behind -direct is to not use a service provider to
>> place an emergency call. Instead, the device registers with
>> an Emergency Services Routing Proxy immediately before the
>> call and the call is routed directly from the device to the ESRP.
>>
>> At least at the moment, this is an exceedingly bad idea.
>>
>> Emergency calling authorities like service providers, a lot.
>> They like them because they can hold them accountable, and the
>> service providers don't like theft of service, which is
>> something the emergency call guys have an analog to.
>>
>> The facts are that where unaccountable access to emergency
>> calling is allowed, huge numbers of false calls occur, with no
>> way to stop them, and no way to tell the good ones from the
>> bad ones. This has been seen multiple times where so called
>> "simless" or "unauthenticated" calls are allowed.
>>
>> -direct precisely duplicates simless calling. The only
>> "registration" is an emergency registration, only emergency
>> calls are allowed, any device can make an emergency call if
>> all it has is a (radio) connection to any network.
>> We can predict, with a very high degree of certainty, that the
>> feature will be horribly abused: for example to test that a
>> phone without a service plan works.
>>
>> There have been studies which show tens of thousands of bad
>> calls with zero good ones. Nearly every authority I know
>> where the regulator has insisted on simless calling wants it
>> repealed. There is one counter example I know where the fact
>> that they got a couple, literally, of good calls among the
>> tens of thousands of bad calls was considered enough reason to
>> put up with the problem.
>>
>> Service providers give us information that may be useful: a
>> subscriber name and address for example, which is not
>> spoofable by the caller. They have ways to trace callers,
>> especially bad callers. They don't want their systems abused
>> any more than the emergency calling authorities do.
>>
>> This is a bad idea. A very bad idea. Please stop it.
>>
>> Someday, we may have better ways to prevent abuse. Until we
>> do, service providers are a good thing on an emergency call.
>> We don't want them cut out.
>>
>> Brian
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>> Geopriv@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/geopriv
>>
>
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