A LIS can authorize location configuration requests using a policy that allows Devices to acquire their own location (see Section 4.1). If an unauthorized third-party falsifies addressing on request packets to match the provided Device identity, the request might be erroneously authorized under this policy. Requests containing Device identity must not be authorized using this policy unless specific measures are taken to prevent this type of attack.
[BA] Since in HELD return routability is presumed to ensure against IP address spoofing of HTTP over TCP requests, I'm assuming that this is not the address falsification being referred to here, right? I guess that leaves MAC address and the cellular identifiers.
So, since IDNA-aware applications and protocols, the three forms can appear together, I've qualified the statement:
This IDN-aware domain name slot [I-D.ietf-idnabis-defs] MAY be formed
from any sequence of valid labels (A-label, U-labels or NR-LDH-
label). Binary or bit string labels cannot be represented in this
domain name slot.
[BA] If the domain slot is IDN-aware, wouldn't it make sense to prefer a U-label? Also, I don't think you want to allow an FQDN that is a mixture of U-labels and A-labels.
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